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International Taxation and the Role of Organizational Form 
Choices for Group Structures of Multinationals
Abstract
We examine whether, when, and to what extent international taxation affects group structures 
of multinationals by way of organizational form choices. Analyzing micro-level data on 
inbound foreign direct investment relations in Germany, we find that multinationals are tax-
sensitive when choosing an organizational form for a foreign affiliate. We document that a 
one standard deviation increase in the tax burden difference between a corporate (i.e. 
subsidiary) and a non-corporate (i.e. flow-through) organizational form is associated with a 
3.57 percentage point higher probability of establishing a flow-through. This effect, which 
predominantly results from differences in repatriation taxes between organizational forms, is 
economically meaningful and comparable to the effects of non-tax determinants. In cross-
sectional tests, we find that income-shifting opportunities, limited liability, group structure 
adjustment costs, and host-country experience moderate the tax-sensitivity. Taken together, 
our findings suggest that international taxation has far-reaching implications for group 
structures of multinationals. 
JEL-Classification: M41, H25, H73, K34
Keywords: Organizational Form Choice, Group Structures, International Taxation
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, group structures of multinationals have caught the attention of the 
general public, policy makers, and academic scholars. Group structures with affiliates in 
several countries enable multinationals to shift income into tax havens and to exploit 
loopholes in tax systems.1 Despite the implications of this topic, evidence on how the 
taxation of cross-border economic activities (i.e. international taxation) shapes group 
structures is limited to the location of affiliates (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010, Dyreng, 
Lindsey, Markle, and Shackelford 2015), internal ownership chains (Lewellen and Robinson 
2013), and the decision to maintain separate taxation of affiliates for income-shifting 
purposes (Buettner, Riedel, and Runkel 2011).2 Moreover, these studies exclusively examine 
corporate affiliates as one organizational form multinationals might select for their affiliates. 
Our study takes a broader perspective in analyzing group structures, as we examine the 
sensitivity of multinationals to international taxation when choosing an organizational form 
for a newly established foreign affiliate (i.e. organizational form choices). Thus, we inquire
whether, when, and to what extent international taxation affects organizational form choices. 
The lack of evidence for the effect of international taxation on the organizational 
form choices of multinationals is surprising, as organizational forms have been on the tax-
policy agenda for several years due to qualification conflicts between tax systems resulting 
in double taxation or double non-taxation of foreign profit (OECD 1999). Moreover, recent 
anecdotes suggest that multinationals establish non-corporate affiliates for tax-avoidance 
purposes (ICIJ 2014).3 Thus, the lack of knowledge regarding the drivers of organizational 
1 Recent reports from Dutch regulatory filings suggest that Google saved $3.6 billion in worldwide taxes in the 
year 2015 through a group structure known as “Double Irish and a Dutch Sandwich” (Wood 2016). This group 
structure has reportedly been used by several other multinationals (e.g., Apple). Particularities of tax systems 
combined with the fundamental freedoms of the European Union enable multinationals to shift taxable income 
into tax havens (e.g., via tax-deductible royalty payments) diminishing effective tax rates. 
2 International taxation summarizes all taxes levied on foreign profit (Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème 2008,
Huizinga and Voget 2009, Barrios, Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème 2012; see Section 2.1). 
3 The group structure of Amazon includes a tax-exempt limited partnership in Luxembourg, which enables 
Amazon to generate tax-deductible royalty payments that reduce the Luxembourgian tax base (ICIJ 2014). 
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form choices hinders informed tax-policy debates and makes it difficult to assess the 
relevance of organizational forms for tax avoidance. 
In our setting, we analyze an investing entity that is part of a multinational. The 
investing entity is located in a home country and establishes a new affiliate in a host country 
(Figure 1).4 The available organizational forms are divided into two categories: (1) a 
corporate (i.e. subsidiary) and (2) a non-corporate (i.e. flow-through) form. Each category 
exhibits distinct characteristics that shape their tax and non-tax costs and benefits. 
International taxation determines the tax effects of organizational forms and the tax burden 
on foreign profit earned in the host country. In case the investing entity establishes the new 
affiliate as a subsidiary, this organizational form induces a higher tax burden on foreign 
profit and thus a tax disadvantage. This tax-burden difference results from dividend-
withholding taxes levied on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions in the host country by way 
of a repatriation tax. A flow-through avoids dividend-withholding taxes but the home 
country taxes foreign profit when earned. With regard to non-tax cost and benefits, a 
subsidiary offers limited liability (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994, Ayers, Cloyd and 
Robinson 1996) but induces higher compliance costs due to more extensive regulatory and 
financial reporting requirements (Demirguc-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic 2006, Cerutti, 
Dell’Ariccia, and Martinez Peria 2007). 
When establishing a new affiliate in the host country, the investing entity faces a 
trade-off between tax and non-tax costs and benefits, and selects the organizational form 
with the best cost-benefit relation (Hodder, McAnally, and Weaver 2003, Scholes, Wolfson, 
Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 2014). This suggests that investing entities are 
sensitive to the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary in organizational form choices. Thus, we 
4 The investing entity is located in either the same country as the ultimate parent of the multinational (direct 
investment) or in a different country (indirect investment). Due to missing data on the entire group structure, we 
limit our analysis to the effects of international taxation on organizational form choices of the investing entity. 
However, we separately examine direct and indirect investment in Section 5.3. 
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hypothesize that a larger tax-burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through 
increases the probability of establishing the new affiliate as a flow-through. 
Notwithstanding our hypothesis, several arguments suggest that we might not find the 
expected effect. First, multinationals might mitigate the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary by 
deferring the repatriation of foreign profit (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite 2007, Blouin 
and Krull 2009). This strategy is beneficial if home country corporate income tax rates or 
dividend-withholding tax rates vary over time (e.g., through tax holidays or new double tax 
treaties). Second, multinationals might repatriate foreign profit without triggering the effects 
of international taxation. Common strategies include income shifting (e.g., via tax-deductible 
payments; see Hines and Rice 1994, Collins and Shackelford 1997, Collins, Kemsley, and 
Lang 1998, Klassen and Laplante 2012) or treaty shopping where multinationals engage in 
indirect investment to exploit beneficial double tax treaties (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010, 
Dyreng et al. 2015). Third, non-tax aspects (e.g., limited liability) might affect organizational 
form choices (Demirguc-Kunt et al 2006, Cerutti et al. 2007) and mitigate the tax-sensitivity 
of investing entities. Based on these arguments, we contend that it is an empirical question 
whether, when, and to what extent international taxation affects organizational form choices.
To test our hypothesis, we use the Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. The MiDi database provides anonymized micro-level data on the 
stock of in- and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) relations in Germany and contains 
information on the organizational form of these investments. Our sample covers inbound 
FDI relations that result in a new affiliate in Germany between 2005-2013.5 We observe 
2,182 organizational form choices of investing entities that are part of multinationals located 
in 59 home countries. These home countries include major economies (e.g., the United 
5 Limiting our analysis to one host country does not affect the generalizability of our results. First, organizational 
form choices occur in one regulatory environment mitigating the effect of host country characteristics. Second, 
although tax systems differ in details, international taxation applies to most country combinations (Huizinga et al. 
2008, Huizinga and Voget 2009, Barrios et al. 2012). Third, Germany is a high-tax country and the fourth largest 
economy (IMF 2016), where economic rather than tax-avoidance motives drive investment. 
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States, the United Kingdom, and Japan) and account for more than 99 percent of all inbound 
FDI relations recorded in the MiDi database. Due to variations in tax rates and tax systems 
across home countries and over time, our setting is unique to identify and estimate the effect 
of international taxation on organizational form choices of multinationals.
Descriptive statistics indicate that 24.43 percent of the organizational form choices in 
our sample result in a flow-through. This result underlines the relevance of flow-throughs for 
group structures of multinationals. Results from our first set of tests suggest that investing 
entities are tax-sensitive in organizational form choices. The tax burden difference between a 
subsidiary and a flow-through, which predominantly results from differences in repatriation 
taxes, has an economically meaningful effect: a one standard deviation increase in the tax 
disadvantage of a subsidiary is associated with a 3.57 percentage point higher probability of 
establishing a flow-through. We find comparable effects for non-tax determinants. A one
standard deviation increase in the profitability of the new affiliate, for instance, reduces the 
probability of establishing a flow-through by 5 percentage points. 
Our second set of tests examines whether income-shifting opportunities decrease the 
tax-sensitivity. We find that investing entities are less tax-sensitive if the new affiliate has 
high internal debt or is established in an industry with high intangible-asset intensity (Hall, 
Helmers, Rogers, and Sena 2014). These results suggest that repatriation strategies that do 
not trigger the effects of international taxation (e.g., income shifting) decrease the tax-
sensitivity in organizational form choices. Deferring the repatriation of foreign profit, 
however, does not affect the tax-sensitivity. 
The third set of tests exploits cross-sectional variation in the relevance of non-tax 
aspects associated with organizational form choices. First, we examine new affiliates 
established in capital-intensive industries raising the benefit of limited liability (Liu 2014). 
Consistent with this argument, we find that investing entities are less tax-sensitive in these 
industries. Second, we compare genuine investment (i.e. greenfield investment) with mergers 
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or acquisitions (i.e. M&A). M&A enables multinationals to adapt a pre-existing group 
structure to international taxation at low cost (Huizinga and Voget 2009). Thus, we predict 
and find that investing entities are more tax-sensitive in organizational form choices for 
M&A. Third, we examine the effect of host-country experience. Since experienced investing 
entities exhibit knowledge on tax-efficient group structures (Feller and Schanz 2017), we 
find a higher tax-sensitivity for these investing entities. These results suggest that non-tax 
aspects, in the form of limited liability, group structure adjustment costs, and host-country 
experience, moderate the tax-sensitivity of investing entities in organizational form choices. 
In our fourth set of tests, we assess the robustness of our results. First, we replace the 
tax burden difference with the dividend-withholding tax rate and find consistent results. 
Second, we add the tax burden difference on capital gains from selling the new affiliate. 
Including this additional tax determinant does not alter our results. Third, we examine the 
legal origin of the home-country legal system (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
2008) and find that institutional similarities between countries do not drive our results. 
Fourth, we compare new affiliates that belong to a subgroup in Germany with those that do 
not hold shares in another German affiliate. We find that international taxation affects group 
structures irrespective of whether the new affiliate belongs to a subgroup or not. Lastly, we 
modify our sample and show that our results are insensitive to excluding observations from 
regulated industries or observations with a tax burden difference equal to zero, and to 
excluding investing entities located in a tax haven (Gravelle 2009). 
The final set of tests provides further evidence for the effect of international taxation 
on organizational form choices of multinationals. First, we subdivide flow-throughs into 
partnerships and branches. Some types of partnerships induce limited liability but retain a 
lower tax burden. Thus, we expect and find that investing entities are tax-sensitive when 
deciding between a subsidiary and a partnership while the benefit of limited liability 
dominates the choice between a subsidiary and a branch. Second, we examine treaty 
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shopping as a potential strategy to mitigate the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary. We find that 
the tax-sensitivity does not differ between direct and indirect investment. Thus, treaty 
shopping does not affect our main results.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our findings increase 
the understanding of how international taxation shapes group structures of multinationals. 
International taxation has far-reaching implications for the structure multinationals adopt for 
their cross-border economic activities as it not only affects the location of affiliates (Mintz 
and Weichenrieder 2010, Dyreng et al. 2015) but also their organizational forms. This 
finding is relevant as each organizational form induces distinct tax and non-tax costs and 
benefits. Moreover, the relevance of flow-throughs indicates that prior studies that examine 
corporate affiliates seem to have overlooked significant parts of existing group structures. 
Second, our results add to research on the effects of taxation on organizational form 
choices where prior studies have mainly examined stand-alone firms (Gordon and MacKie-
Mason 1994, Ayers et al. 1996). We extend these findings by investigating organizational 
form choices in a cross-border setting.6 In this regard, we identify distinct drivers of cross-
sectional variation in the effect of taxation (i.e. income-shifting opportunities, group 
structure adjustment costs, host-country experience) that differ from domestic settings. 
Moreover, the relevance of flow-throughs suggests that multinationals might use 
organizational forms as part of a broader tax-avoidance strategy.
Lastly, our study informs current tax-policy initiatives to curb tax avoidance and 
income shifting (e.g., OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting). These 
initiatives aim to ensure profit taxation in the host country and thus increase the relevance of 
host country taxation and repatriation taxes (e.g., dividend-withholding taxes). Our results 
suggest that legislation leading to an asymmetric taxation of subsidiaries and flow-throughs 
6 Petroni and Shackelford (1995) and Goolsbee (2004) are noteworthy exceptions. Both studies, however, examine 
group structures in a purely domestic U.S. setting.
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increases the probability that multinationals select a flow-through for cross-border economic 
activities. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical background and derives our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and the 
research design. Section 4 presents our main results. Supplementary analyses are presented 
in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes our main results and concludes.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
International Taxation and Tax Effects of Organizational Forms
Figure 1 outlines our setting of an investing entity that selects an organizational form 
for a new affiliate in Germany, the host country in our study. The investing entity is part of a 
multinational and is located in the same country as the ultimate parent of the multinational 
(e.g., the United States: direct investment) or in a different country (e.g., Luxembourg: 
indirect investment). We define two categories of organizational forms: (1) subsidiaries and 
(2) flow-throughs.7 Subsidiaries are legally independent corporate forms while flow-throughs 
comprise non-corporate forms (e.g., partnerships, branches, and permanent establishments) 
that belong to the investing entity. Profit earned in a foreign subsidiary or flow-through is 
subject to three layers of taxation that shape the tax effects of organizational forms. These 
three layers are (i) host country corporate income tax, (ii) dividend-withholding tax levied on 
a subsidiary’s dividend distributions, and (iii) corporate income tax levied in the home 
country of the investing entity (e.g., Huizinga et al. 2008). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The first layer of international taxation is the host country corporate income tax  ℎ
(Layer 1 in Figure 1). A subsidiary exhibits unlimited tax liability while the investing entity is 
7 In supplementary tests, we subdivide flow-throughs into (i) partnerships and (ii) branches. As these sub-groups 
exhibit similar tax effects, and to increase the generalizability of our findings, we limit our main analysis to two 
categories of organizational forms (i.e. subsidiaries and flow-throughs). 
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subject to limited tax liability in the host country when choosing a flow-through. Nonetheless, 
the host country taxes profit earned in both organizational forms at  (e.g., Article 7 ℎ
OECD Model Tax Convention, OECD 2014). For Germany,  equals to 44.38 percent for ℎ
the first sample years but reduces to 29.83 percent after the year 2007.8
The second layer of international taxation is the dividend-withholding tax  levied 
on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions in the host country (Layer 2 in Figure 1). This tax is 
deferred until foreign profit is repatriated to the investing entity (Foley et al. 2007, Blouin 
and Krull 2009). Thus,  has the character of a shareholder-level tax (Scholes et al. 2014, 
Utke 2016) and a repatriation tax (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2001). The German tax rate on 
dividend distributions to non-EU countries and to countries without a double tax treaty was 
26.38 percent but was reduced to 15.83 percent after the year 2008. The Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive abolishes  for dividend distributions to EU countries.
The Parent - Subsidiary Directive requires the investing entity to hold at least 10 percent
 in the shares of a subsidiary
. As we limit our analysis to investing entities that hold at least 25 percent in the shares of a new affiliate (see Section 3.2), in our sample the dividend
- withholding tax rate for investing entities located in EU countries equals zero. 9 For home countries that have a double tax treaty with Germany, depends on the treaty 
and ranges from 5 percent to 15 percent. A flow-through fully avoids the second layer of 
international taxation.10
The third layer of international taxation is the home country corporate income tax 
 (Layer 3 in Figure 1). To mitigate double taxation, the home country either exempts ℎ
8 These tax rates include a solidarity surcharge and the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) administered by German 
municipalities. We present average tax rates as municipalities enjoy (limited) leeway in setting tax rates. 
9 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive requires the investing entity to hold at least 10 percent in the shares of a 
subsidiary. As we limit our analysis to investing entities that hold at least 25 percent in the shares of a new affiliate 
(see Section 3.2), in our sample the dividend-withholding tax rate for investing entities located in EU countries 
equals zero. 
10 Some countries levy a tax on the profit distributions of a branch to achieve an equal taxation of a subsidiary and 
a branch. An example is the 30 percent U.S. Branch Profit Tax levied on distributions of U.S. branches to non-
resident shareholders (IRC §884(a)). The tax rate equals  and may be reduced through a double tax treaty.
- 9 -
foreign profit from  (territorial tax system) or taxes foreign profit at  while ℎ ℎ
granting a tax credit for  and  (worldwide tax system).  ℎ
Territorial tax systems differ in the extent to which foreign profit is exempt from 
. Home countries either fully exempt foreign profit or tax a fraction  at . If ℎ  ℎ
, the investing entity is subject to home country corporate income tax notwithstanding  > 0
an existing territorial tax system.11 As a result, for an investing entity located in a home 
country with a territorial tax system, the tax burden on foreign profit earned in a subsidiary  
or a flow-through  is given by
, = ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗  + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗  ∗ ℎ
. = ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗  ∗ ℎ
Under a worldwide tax system, the home country taxes foreign profit earned in a 
subsidiary when repatriated to the investing entity.12 To mitigate double taxation, the home 
country grants a direct or indirect tax credit, which is limited to  in both cases.13 If the ℎ
home country grants a direct tax credit,  is credited and the investing entity is subject to 
home county corporate income tax in excess of . An indirect tax credit (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗ 
additionally includes , and the investing entity is subject to home country corporate ℎ
income tax in excess of . When choosing a flow-through, the home ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗ 
country taxes foreign profit when earned and grants a tax credit for . Thus, the investing ℎ
entity is subject to home country corporate income tax in excess of . As a result, for an ℎ
11 Belgium and Italy, for instance, operate a territorial tax system and exempt 95 percent of foreign profit. Thus, 5 
percent of foreign profit remains taxable at .ℎ
12 This feature enables multinationals to defer the repatriation of foreign profit and to benefit from variation in 
 or  over time (e.g., through tax holidays or new double tax treaties).ℎ 
13 The United States operate a worldwide tax system with deferral and an indirect tax credit. Similar tax systems 
were in place in the United Kingdom and Japan prior to the year 2009 (Markle 2016). 
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investing entity located in a home country with a worldwide tax system, the tax burden on 
foreign profit earned in a subsidiary  or a flow-through  is given by 
, (direct tax credit) = ⁡{ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗ ;  ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗ ℎ }
, (indirect tax credit) = ⁡{ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗ ;  ℎ }
. = ⁡{ℎ ; ℎ }
Some home countries neither exempt foreign profit from  nor grant a tax credit ℎ
for  and , which results in double taxation. As a result, for an investing entity located  ℎ
in a home country that does not grant any relief from double taxation, the tax burden on 
foreign profit earned in a subsidiary  or a flow-through  is given by 
, = ℎ + (1 ‒ ℎ ) ∗  + ℎ
. = ℎ + ℎ
In Table 1, we derive the tax burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-
through for each tax system. In contrast to a flow-through, a subsidiary induces a tax 
disadvantage if the investing entity is located in a home country with a territorial tax system 
or in a home country that does not grant any relief from double taxation. This is due to 
dividend-withholding taxes, which are not offset by a tax credit in the home country. If the 
investing entity is located in a home country with a worldwide tax system, the tax 
disadvantage depends on host and home country corporate income tax rates and the extent of 
tax credit.14
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
14 The tax burden difference might be negative if the investing entity is located in a home country that operates a 
worldwide tax system for flow-throughs and a territorial system for subsidiaries. Most home countries in our 
sample, however, operate a uniform tax system for foreign profit earned in either organizational form. 
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Hypothesis Development
The standard model to analyze organizational form choices was developed by 
MacKie-Mason and Gordon (1997) and extended by Goolsbee (1998, 2004). These studies 
examine the decisions of sole entrepreneurs (i.e. stand-alone firms) to incorporate or not in a 
domestic setting. While tax and non-tax determinants of organizational form choices of 
multinationals seem to differ from those documented for stand-alone firms, Luna and Murray 
(2010) argue that the economic framework and its implications are equally valid in a cross-
border setting. Thus, when choosing an organizational form for a new affiliate in the host 
country, the investing entity faces a trade-off between tax and non-tax costs and benefits and 
selects the organizational form with the best-cost benefit relation. 
With respect to tax costs and benefits of organizational forms, the theoretical analysis 
above suggests that a subsidiary exhibits a tax disadvantage. This predominantly results from 
higher repatriation taxes in the form of dividend-withholding taxes.15 Hartman (1985) 
theoretically analyzes the economic effects of repatriation taxes and demonstrates that these 
taxes do not affect the repatriation decision of multinationals. Although assuming a subsidiary 
in the host country, this result nonetheless questions the decision relevance of differences in 
repatriation taxes (i.e. the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary) for organizational form choices.16
Hartman (1985), however, relies on the restrictive assumptions that repatriation taxes 
are unavoidable (e.g., through income shifting; see Altshuler and Grubert 2003) and that tax 
rates are constant over time. These assumptions are unlikely to hold in practice. Tax holidays 
or new double tax treaties, for instance, lower home country corporate income tax rates and 
dividend-withholding tax rates.17 As a result, multinationals face tax-rate uncertainty and the 
15 Further tax costs and benefits concern special tax regimes (Elschner 2013), tax loss rules, or tax base effects. 
With respect to these aspects, the German tax system does not differentiate between organizational forms. 
16 Hines and Rice (1994) and Weichenrieder (1996) extend this finding and show that multinationals may reinvest 
foreign profit in risk-free financial assets. This strategy allows a costless deferral of repatriation taxes. 
17 During sample years 2005-2013, Germany reduced the dividend-withholding tax rate from 26.38 percent to 
15.83 percent and signed and/or renewed ten double tax treaties with Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Singapore, Syria, and Tajikistan. Moreover, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive became 
effective for dividend distributions to Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania as these countries joined the European 
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investing entity becomes sensitive to the tax disadvantages of a subsidiary. Several empirical 
findings support these arguments. Foley et al. (2007) and Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 
(2011) analyze the U.S. tax system and find that repatriation taxes diminish incentives to 
repatriate foreign profit while increasing (re-)investment in the host country (Hanlon, Lester, 
and Verdi 2015, Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson 2016). As an increase in the tax disadvantage 
of a subsidiary raises the tax benefit of a flow-through, we formulate the following hypothesis 
for the effect of international taxation on organizational form choices:
H1: The tax disadvantage of a subsidiary in comparison to a flow-through is positively 
associated with the probability of establishing a flow-through. 
The theoretical analysis of international taxation suggests that the tax effects of 
organizational forms arise if multinationals repatriate foreign profit through dividend 
distributions. Thus, repatriation strategies that do not trigger the effects of international 
taxation might mitigate the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices. Income shifting is 
an example of such a repatriation strategy where multinationals shift foreign profit earned in 
the host country into low-tax countries or tax havens (Hines and Rice 1994, Collins and 
Shackelford 1997, Collins et al. 1998, Dyreng and Markle 2016). This behavior avoids the 
host country corporate income tax and might additionally result in lower dividend-
withholding taxes.18 Common income shifting schemes exploit discretion in setting arm’s-
length transfer prices for intermediate inputs (Klassen and Laplante 2012), cost-sharing 
arrangements (De Simone and Sansing 2016), and tax-deductible payments between affiliates 
(e.g., interest or royalty payments). By reducing the amount of foreign profit repatriated 
through dividend distributions, income shifting mitigates the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary 
and the investing entity is expected to become less sensitive to international taxation. Thus, 
Union. Lastly, the double tax treaty with Brazil was terminated raising the dividend withholding tax rate from 15 
percent to 26.38 percent. 
18 Income shifting induces costs that are either fixed or vary with the amount of income shifted (Huizinga and 
Laeven 2008). These costs include initial setup costs (e.g., for foreign affiliates), compliance costs (e.g., for the 
transfer pricing system), and administrative costs (e.g., coordination or agency costs; Dyreng and Markle 2016).
- 13 -
we formulate the following cross-sectional hypothesis for the effect of income-shifting 
opportunities on the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices:
H2: The association between the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through decreases with income shifting opportunities.
Non-tax costs and benefits of organizational forms mainly result from their legal 
characteristics and are likely to affect the tax-sensitivity of investing entities. A subsidiary 
offers limited liability (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994, Ayers et al. 1996) and reduces risk 
by limiting the potential loss of the investing entity to the equity stake in the new affiliate.19
At the same time, a subsidiary induces higher compliance costs due to more extensive 
regulatory and financial reporting requirements (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006) and higher 
coordination costs due to its legal independence (Goolsbee and Maydew 2002). When 
choosing a flow-through, the potential loss of the investing entity is unlimited and includes all 
obligations of the new affiliate. Compliance costs of a flow-through, however, are lower, as 
multinationals might enter the host country through licenses granted to a pre-existing affiliate 
(Cerutti et al. 2007).20
The outlined benefit of limited liability seems particularly valuable in capital-intensive 
industries (e.g., manufacturing or wholesale) characterized by the high importance of tangible 
assets. Investment in tangible assets increases the potential loss of the investing entity and 
raises the benefit of limited liability (Liu 2014). This suggests that an investing entity in a 
capital-intensive industry attributes more weight to the benefit of limited liability resulting in 
a lower tax-sensitivity. Thus, we formulate the following cross-sectional hypothesis for the 
effect of limited liability on the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices:
19 The capital requirement to establish a subsidiary in Germany as a limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung) equals EUR 25,000. Thus, without additional guarantees (MacKie-Mason and Gordon 
1997) the potential loss of the investing entity is limited to this amount. 
20 Other non-tax costs and benefits of organizational forms are less relevant for multinationals. Capital market 
access, for instance, is a relevant aspect for stand-alone firms (Gordon and MacKie-Mason 1994, Scholes et al. 
2014) while multinationals may raise equity or debt capital globally and finance foreign activities through internal 
capital markets (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004).
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H3a: The association between the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through decreases with the importance of limited liability.
Aside from limited liability, further non-tax aspects may affect the tax-sensitivity in 
organizational form choices. For instance, investing entities might select an organizational 
form for either a newly founded affiliate (i.e. greenfield investment) or an existing firm that is 
acquired (i.e. M&A). While non-tax decisions (e.g., financing or investment) dominate 
organizational form choices for greenfield investment, M&A enables multinationals to adapt a 
pre-existing group structure to international taxation at low cost (Huizinga and Voget 2009). 
This suggests that the investing entity attributes more weight to the tax disadvantage of a 
subsidiary in organizational form choices for M&A resulting in a higher tax-sensitivity. Thus, 
we formulate the following cross-sectional hypothesis for the effect of group structure 
adjustment costs on the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices: 
H3b: The association between the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through increases in organizational form choices for M&A.
Establishing a new affiliate may also involve a market entry in the host country. In 
contrast to an initial market entry, multinationals with host-country experience exhibit 
knowledge of tax-efficient group structures (Feller and Schanz 2017). This suggests that an 
experienced investing entity attributes more weight to the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary 
resulting in a higher tax-sensitivity. Thus, we formulate the following cross-sectional 
hypothesis for the effect of host-country experience on the tax-sensitivity in organizational 
form choices:
H3c: The association between the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary and the probability of 
establishing a flow-through increases with host country experience.
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III. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
MiDi Database and Supplementary Data Sources 
As our main data source, we use data on inbound FDI relations provided by the MiDi 
database of the Deutsche Bundesbank.21 This database includes anonymized micro-level data 
on the stock of in- and outbound FDI relations in Germany starting in the year 1999. As the 
German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung) mandates 
annual reports on FDI relations, data availability is independent of financial reporting 
requirements. Penalties and data appraisal techniques ensure high data quality (Lipponer 
2011, Schild and Walter 2015) making the MiDi database superior over most commercial data 
sources. 
An inbound FDI relation has to be reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank if an 
investing entity holds at least 10 percent in the shares or voting rights of a subsidiary or a 
partnership with a balance sheet total of more than EUR 3 million. A branch and a permanent 
establishment has to be reported if the business assets amount to EUR 3 million and over 
(Lipponer 2011, Schild and Walter 2015). 
The MiDi database provides detailed information on the affiliate associated with the 
inbound FDI relation including an identifier for its organizational form. Data on the investing 
entity and the ultimate parent of a multinational is limited to an identifier for the investing 
entity, the ultimate parent, and the respective home countries. Thus, we are able to disentangle 
direct investment from indirect investment (Figure 1). We supplement data from the MiDi 
database with information on dividend-withholding tax rates, home and host country 
corporate income tax rates, tax base determinants, and the tax system in the home country. 
We hand-collect this data from public sources (e.g., Ernst & Young Worldwide Corporate 
Tax Guides, Ernst & Young 2005-2013).
21 DOI: 10.12757/Bbk.MiDi.9913.01.01.
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Sample Selection 
To construct a sample of organizational form choices, we identify the first observation 
of an inbound FDI relation in Germany for the period 1999-2013 (18,265 observations).22
First, we drop observations prior to the year 2005 as the information to differentiate between 
new affiliates and pre-existing affiliates is unavailable (12,206 observations). Second, we 
drop observations where the investing entity holds less than 25 percent of the shares of a new 
affiliate (360 observations). This threshold ensures that the investing entity is able to 
influence the organizational form choice.23 For a new affiliate with multiple investing entities, 
we keep the observation for the main investor. Third, we delete observations where the 
investing entity is located in a home country without tax information (19 observations). 
Lastly, we drop observations of pre-existing affiliates, as the first observation in the MiDi 
database results from passing the reporting threshold and does not involve an organizational 
form choice (3,498 observations). For sample years 2005-2013, these restrictions result in a 
sample of 2,182 organizational form choices. The new affiliates in our sample are either 
established through greenfield investment (1,051 observations) or M&A (1,131 observations). 
Table 2 summarizes the sample selection.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The investing entities facing an organizational form choice in our sample are located 
in 59 home countries. These countries account for more than 99 percent of all inbound FDI 
relations recorded in the MiDi database. 45 countries exhibit a double tax treaty with 
Germany while 14 countries have sizeable inbound FDI relations without a double tax treaty. 
For each home-country year, we apply the formulas in Table 1 to compute the tax burden 
22 We analyze inbound FDI relations of investing entities because the tax burden difference between a subsidiary 
and a flow-through does not exist in a domestic setting. Thus, we disregard observations where the investing entity 
establishes a subsidiary or a flow-through indirectly through another German affiliate.
23 We derive this threshold from German corporate law. Strategic decisions require the consent of more than 75 
percent of the shareholders (Sperrminorität). Thus, an investing entity holding at least 25 percent of the shares of 
a new affiliate is able to influence strategic decisions (e.g., organizational form choices). Our inferences are 
unchanged when requiring a threshold of 50, 75 percent, or 100 percent. 
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(1)
difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through. Differences between home countries and 
changes over time imply variation in tax rates and tax systems. Thus, we observe variation in 
the tax burden difference (Table 3) and in dividend-withholding tax rates (Table 4). 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Research Design
To model an organizational form choice and to test our hypotheses, we estimate the 
following logistic regression model:24
ln  ‒ 1 ‒  ‒  =  0 + 1 + ∑ +  +  + .
 and is the probability that the 
 ‒  = (0 + 1 + ∑)1 + (0 + 1 + ∑)
investing entity j establishes the new affiliate i as a flow-through. Unless indicated otherwise, 
we measure all variables in year t, which is the year of the organizational form choice. The 
dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable with the value of one if the 
new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise (i.e. as a subsidiary). 
TAXWEDGE is the tax-burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through on 
foreign profit earned in the host country, and captures the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary. 
Consistent with H1 and the argument that investing entities are sensitive to international 
taxation in organizational form choices, a larger tax burden difference raises the tax benefit of 
a flow-through. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on .1
Vector X includes variables to control for additional determinants of organizational 
form choices. First, we include affiliate-level controls. We add LN(EMPLOY) as the logarithm 
of total employees and LN(ASSETS) as the logarithm of total assets to proxy for size. Large 
24 We define variables in the appendix. 
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affiliates increase the potential loss of the investing entity (Liu 2014) which raises the benefit 
of limited liability induced by a subsidiary. Thus, we expect for both variables a negative 
effect on FLOW-THROUGH. LOSSYEAR is an indicator variable with the value of one if the 
new affiliate reports a loss in year t.25 We again expect a negative effect as losses indicate 
risk, raising the benefit of limited liability (Ayers et al. 1996). 
Furthermore, we add LEVERAGE as the debt ratio. Debtholders demand financial 
statement information (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010), which is more extensive for a 
subsidiary. Thus, we expect that LEVERAGE reduces the probability of establishing a flow-
through. We also include ROA as net profit over total assets to control for profitability but do 
not make a directional prediction for the effect on FLOW-THROUGH. We include 
BROWNFIELD as an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established 
through M&A, and zero otherwise (i.e. greenfield investment). We expect a negative effect 
for BROWNFIELD, as shares in a subsidiary are more readily transferable than shares in a 
flow-through making M&A for a subsidiary less costly. 
To control for the repatriation of foreign profit, we add DISTRIBUTION as an 
indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate distributes foreign profit in year 
t+1. As dividend-withholding taxes are levied on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions making 
the repatriation of foreign profit more costly for this organizational form (Foley et al. 2007, 
Blouin and Krull 2009), we expect a positive effect of DISTRIBUTION on FLOW-
THROUGH. We add INTERNDEBT and INTANGIBLES to control for income-shifting 
opportunities. INTERNDEBT is the ratio of related-party debt to total assets and 
INTANGIBLES an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established in 
an industry with high intangible-asset intensity (e.g., pharmaceuticals or chemicals; Hall et al. 
2014). Income shifting via tax-deductible payments enables multinationals to repatriate 
25 In untabulated tests, we extend LOSSYEAR to two years and three years of consecutive losses. These tests result 
in a smaller sample size but our main inferences are unchanged.
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foreign profit without triggering the effects of international taxation. This mitigates the tax 
disadvantage of a subsidiary and we expect for both variables a negative effect on FLOW-
THROUGH. 
Second, we control for characteristics of the investing entity. We add NUMINV as the 
number of inbound FDI relations of the investing entity in Germany. A high number of 
inbound FDI relations indicates that risk is spread across several affiliates, reducing the 
benefit of limited liability in the new affiliate. Thus, we expect a positive effect on FLOW-
THROUGH. We include HOLDINGS as the percentage of shares held by the investing entity 
in the new affiliate to capture cooperation among investing entities. As cooperation requires 
trust and commitment (e.g., through unlimited liability), the probability of establishing a flow-
through is expected to decrease in HOLDINGS. We add DIRECTFDI as an indicator variable 
with the value of one if the investing entity engages in direct investment, and zero otherwise 
(i.e. indirect investment). We do not make a directional prediction as multinationals engage in 
indirect investment to benefit from double tax treaties (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010, 
Wamser 2011) or to exploit regulatory differences between countries (Cerutti et al. 2007). The 
first strategy requires a subsidiary to obtain tax treaty entitlement, while the second strategy 
involves a flow-through operating through licenses granted to a pre-existing affiliate. 
Third, we control for characteristics of the home country of the investing entity. We 
add LN(DIST) as the natural logarithm of the distance between the capital city of the home 
country and Germany to control for coordination costs of the new affiliate. As a flow-through 
implies lower coordination costs than a subsidiary (Goolsbee and Maydew 2002), we expect a 
positive effect of LN(DIST) on FLOW-THROUGH. Lastly, we add YEAR and INDUSTRY as 
fixed effects to capture year shocks and time-invariant industry characteristics that may affect 
organizational form choices. We estimate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the investing-entity level to account for serial correlation in the data (Petersen 2009).26
26 Our main inferences are unchanged when using alternative clusters (industry, year, home country of the investing 
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To test our cross-sectional hypotheses, we modify Equation (1) and include interaction 
variables that partition our sample into subsamples in which theory predicts differences in the 
tax-sensitivity of investing entities. We explain these tests in more detail below. 
IV. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Our sample of organizational form choices includes 1,649 subsidiaries and 533 flow-
throughs. Thus, the unconditional probability of establishing a flow-through is 24.43 percent 
(533/2,182). Table 5, Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the full sample and for 
subsamples of subsidiaries and flow-throughs. A t-test indicates that the mean tax burden 
difference in the flow-through subsample is higher than in the subsidiary subsample 
(TAXWEDGE, p < 0.01). This result is consistent with H1 and the argument that investing 
entities are tax-sensitive in organizational form choices. 
As we observe more subsidiaries than flow-throughs, further determinants affect 
organizational form choices. Flow-throughs have fewer employees (LN(EMPLOY), p < 0.01), 
a lower profitability (ROA, p < 0.01), and a lower ratio of related-party debt to total assets 
(INTERNDEBT, p < 0.01). In addition, flow-throughs are less likely to report a loss 
(LOSSYEAR, p < 0.01) and to be established through M&A (BROWNFIELD, p = 0.06) or in 
an industry with high intangible-asset intensity (INTANGIBLES, p < 0.01). In contrast, flow-
throughs are more likely to distribute foreign profit (DISTRIBUTION, p < 0.01). An investing 
entity that establishes a flow-through has a higher number of inbound FDI relations 
(NUMINV, p < 0.01), holds a lower percentage of shares in the new affiliate (HOLDINGS, 
p < 0.01), is less likely to engage in direct investment (DIRECTFDI, p < 0.01), and is located 
in a less distant home country (LN(DIST), p < 0.01). Total assets (LN(ASSETS), p = 0.15) and 
the debt ratio (LEVERAGE, p = 0.77), however, do not differ between subsamples. 
entity, and home country of ultimate parent).
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Panel B presents organizational form choices per sample year. The number of new 
affiliates increases in sample years 2005-2007 and after the year 2010. We observe a lower 
number of new affiliates for sample years 2008-2010, which is likely due to the global 
financial crisis. The proportion of flow-throughs varies over time with the relevance of flow-
throughs increasing in sample years 2007-2009 and again after the year 2010. 
Panel C presents organizational form choices per industry.27 We observe the highest 
number of new affiliates in the financial services industry, and the lowest in the transportation 
industry. The number of flow-throughs is highest in the energy supply and construction 
industries, and lowest in the wholesale and manufacturing industries. These differences 
suggest that industry-level determinants affect organizational form choices. 
Panel D presents organizational form choices per home country of the investing entity.28
We observe the highest number of new affiliates for investing entities located in neighboring 
countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands) and major economies (the United States, the United 
Kingdom). Consistent with variation in the tax burden difference, the relevance of each 
organizational form varies across home countries. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Table 6 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for univariate correlations between 
dependent and independent variables. TAXWEDGE exhibits a positive correlation with 
FLOW-THROUGH (p < 0.01), which is in line with H1. Correlations between the remaining 
independent variables and FLOW-THROUGH are largely consistent with our expectations. As 
most variables are correlated, we draw our inferences from multivariate tests below. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
27 We aggregate observations based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes to ensure a meaningful analysis. 
28 We present home countries with at least three observations per organizational form that result from three distinct 
investing entities. Our sample includes another 32 home countries that do not fulfill this confidentiality 
requirement.
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Baseline Regression Results: Tax-Sensitivity in Organizational Form Choices
We begin by testing H1, which predicts that the probability of establishing a flow-
through increases with the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary. Table 7 presents regression 
results based on Equation (1).29 In column 1, the coefficient on TAXWEDGE is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01), which indicates that the probability of establishing a flow-through 
increases in the tax burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through. In column 3, 
including control variables in the regression leads to similar inferences.30
Results for further determinants are generally consistent with our expectations. The 
probability of establishing a flow-through decreases if the new affiliate reports a loss 
(LOSSYEAR, p < 0.01). Moreover, the probability decreases with the profitability of the new 
affiliate (ROA, p = 0.05) and with the percentage of shares held by the investing entity 
(HOLDINGS, p < 0.01). Flow-throughs are less likely to be established in case of M&A 
(BROWNFIELD, p < 0.01), in case of industries with high intangible-asset intensity 
(INTANGIBLES, p < 0.01), and in case the investing entity engages in direct investment 
(DIRECTFDI, p < 0.01). In contrast, the probability of establishing a flow-through is 
positively associated with the repatriation of foreign profit (DISTRIBUTION, p = 0.02) and 
the number of inbound FDI relations (NUMINV, p = 0.08). In column 5, excluding 
TAXWEDGE does not alter our results. 
In columns 2, 4, and 6, we report marginal effects to assess the economic significance 
of our results. A one standard deviation increase in TAXWEDGE is associated with a 3.57 
percentage point higher probability of establishing a flow-through (column 4). As the 
unconditional probability of establishing a flow-through is 24.43 percent, this effect suggests 
a 14.55 percent (3.57 percent/24.43 percent) increase in the proportion of flow-throughs. In 
29 To facilitate a meaningful comparison of variables, we standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions.
30 The area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve) suggests that our regressions exhibit 
acceptable predictive power (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013). The regression in column 3, for instance, 
correctly predicts the organizational form for 78 percent of our observations.
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comparison, a one standard deviation increase in ROA is associated with a 5 percentage point 
lower probability of establishing a flow-through. Thus, the economic effect of TAXWEDGE
on FLOW-THROUGH is comparable to the effect of non-tax determinants. As corroborating 
evidence, we conduct a likelihood ratio test which suggests that adding TAXWEDGE as an 
explanatory variable increases the model fit of our regressions (χ² = 14.65, p < 0.01). Overall, 
these results support H1: The tax disadvantage of a subsidiary in comparison to a flow-
through affects group structures of multinationals by way of organizational form choices. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
Cross-Sectional Regression Results: Income-Shifting Opportunities and Tax-Sensitivity
H2 predicts that income-shifting opportunities decrease the tax-sensitivity of investing 
entities. To test this, we modify Equation (1) and present results in Table 8. First, we interact 
TAXWEDGE with HIGH_INTDEBT, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if 
the ratio of related-party debt provided by foreign affiliates to total assets of the new affiliate 
is above the sample median. Income shifting, for instance via interest payments, enables 
multinationals to repatriate foreign profit without triggering the effects of international 
taxation. Thus, we expect and find a lower tax-sensitivity for new affiliates with high related-
party debt indicated by a negative and significant coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE#HIGH_INTDEBT (column 1, p < 0.01).31 An F-test suggests that the effect of 
TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for new affiliates with high related-party debt (β1+β3) is 
indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.79). 
Second, we interact TAXWEDGE with INTANGIBLES to proxy for royalty payments 
on intangible assets. Consistent with the previous test, we expect and find a lower tax-
sensitivity for new affiliates established in an industry with high intangible-asset intensity 
31 In untabulated tests, we define HIGH_INTDEBT based on total related-party debt including debt provided by 
domestic affiliates in Germany. As total related-party debt is a less direct proxy for income-shifting opportunities 
than related-party debt provided by foreign affiliates, the coefficient on TAXWEDGE#HIGH_INTDEBT is 
negative but only marginally significant (p = 0.10). The effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for new 
affiliates with a high ratio of total related-party debt to total assets (β1+β3) is different from zero (p = 0.07).
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indicated by a negative and significant coefficient on TAXWEDGE#INTANGIBLES
(column 3, p = 0.09). An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-
THROUGH for new affiliates established in an industry with high intangible-asset intensity 
(β1+β5) is indistinguishable from zero (p = 0.39). Taken together, these results support H2: 
Repatriation strategies that do not trigger the effects of international taxation (e.g., income 
shifting) eliminate the tax-sensitivity of investing entities in organizational form choices. 
We further examine whether the immediate repatriation of foreign profit affects the 
tax-sensitivity of investing entities. As deferring the repatriation of foreign profit reduces the 
tax disadvantage of a subsidiary, the tax-sensitivity might depend on whether investing 
entities anticipate the timing of profit repatriation in organizational form choices. To provide 
a formal test, we interact TAXWEDGE with DISTRIBUTION. In column 5, the coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE#DISTRIBUTION is insignificant (p = 0.18).32 This result suggests that investing 
entities are sensitive to the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary independent of whether or not the 
repatriation of foreign profit is deferred. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Cross-Sectional Regression Results: Non-Tax Aspects and Tax-Sensitivity
H3a, H3b, and H3c predict that variation in the relevance of non-tax aspects associated 
with organizational form choices moderates the tax-sensitivity. To test these hypotheses, we 
modify Equation (1) and interact TAXWEDGE with indicator variables for non-tax aspects. 
We present results in Table 9. First, we examine the benefit of limited liability and interact 
TAXWEDGE with MANU_WHS, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if the 
new affiliate is established in the manufacturing or wholesale industry. As the importance of 
tangible assets increases the benefit of limited liability in these industries, we expect and find 
a lower tax-sensitivity for new affiliates established in the manufacturing or wholesale 
32 An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for new affiliates that distribute foreign 
profit to the investing entity (β1+β7) is larger than zero (p < 0.01).
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industry, indicated by a negative and significant coefficient on TAXWEDGE#MANU_WHS 
(column 1, p = 0.09).33 An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-
THROUGH for new affiliates in these industries (β1+β3) is indistinguishable from zero 
(p = 0.24). These results support H3a: The benefit of limited liability eliminates the tax-
sensitivity of investing entities in capital-intensive industries. 
Second, we examine group structure adjustment costs and interact TAXWEDGE with 
BROWNFIELD, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established through M&A. M&A enables multinationals to adapt a pre-existing group 
structure to international taxation at low cost. Thus, we expect and find a higher tax-
sensitivity in organizational form choices for M&A, indicated by a positive and significant 
coefficient on TAXWEDGE#BROWNFIELD (column 3, p = 0.06). These results support H3b: 
Low group-structure adjustment costs increase the tax-sensitivity of investing entities in 
organizational form choices for M&A.34 The insignificant coefficient on TAXWEDGE
(p = 0.17) suggests that non-tax decisions (e.g., financing or investment) dominate 
organizational form choices for greenfield investment. 
Third, we examine host-country experience and interact TAXWEDGE with MSUBS,
which is an indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity has at least one 
additional inbound FDI relation in Germany. An experienced investing entity has knowledge 
of tax-efficient group structures. Thus, we expect and find a higher tax-sensitivity for 
experienced investing entities, indicated by a positive and significant coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE#MSUBS (column 5, p = 0.03).35 These results support H3c: Host-country 
experience increases the tax-sensitivity of investing entities. The insignificant coefficient on 
33 We drop observations from regulated industries (energy supply, financial services, information and 
communication) due to distinct non-tax benefits of organizational forms in these industries (Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
2006, Cerutti et al. 2007). 
34 An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH in organizational form choices for 
M&A (β1+β5) is larger than zero (p < 0.01).
35 An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for experienced investing entities 
(β1+β7) is larger than zero (p < 0.01).
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TAXWEDGE (p = 0.10) suggests that non-tax aspects dominate organizational form choices 
of inexperienced investing entities.
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE
The above tests suggest that non-tax decisions dominate organizational form choices 
for greenfield investment, while the tax-sensitivity of investing entities increases with host-
country experience. To further examine these effects, we form subsamples for greenfield 
investment and M&A and re-estimate the previous regression for each subsample. We present 
the results in Table 10. In column 1, the coefficient on TAXWEDGE#MSUBS is positive and 
significant for greenfield investment (p = 0.01). An F-test suggests that the effect of 
TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for experienced investing entities (β1+β3) is close to 
significance (p = 0.10). In column 3, the coefficient on TAXWEDGE#MSUBS is insignificant 
for M&A (p = 0.19).36 These results suggest that host-country experience increases the tax-
sensitivity in organizational form choices for greenfield investment while investing entities 
are tax-sensitive in organizational form choices for M&A independent of host-country 
experience. 
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS
Robustness Tests 
We conduct several tests to assess the robustness of our results. First, we include 
additional tax variables and home-country controls. In Table 11, column 1 we replace 
TAXWEDGE with WHT, which is the dividend-withholding tax rate levied on a subsidiary’s 
dividend distributions and simultaneously the main driver of the tax burden difference. In line 
with our main results, the coefficient on WHT is positive and significant (p < 0.01). Moreover, 
the economic effect of WHT in column 2 is similar to the effect of TAXWEDGE in our main 
36 An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for experienced investing entities 
(β1+β3) is larger than zero (p < 0.01).
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tests (Table 7, column 4). In column 3, we add CAPWEDGE, which is the tax burden 
difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through on capital gains from selling the new 
affiliate. The coefficient on CAPWEDGE is insignificant (p = 0.38), while the coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE remains positive and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, international capital gains 
taxation is not a tax determinant for organizational form choices.37 In column 5, we control 
for the legal origin of the home-country legal system to rule out that institutional similarities 
between countries induce non-tax preferences for organizational forms (LaPorta et al. 2008). 
The coefficient on TAXWEDGE remains positive and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, home-
country legal systems do not affect our results.38
INSERT TABLE 11 HERE
Second, we modify our sample and present results in Table 12. In column 1, we 
interact TAXWEDGE with STANDALONE, which is an indicator variable with the value of 
one if the new affiliate does not hold shares in another German affiliate. The coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE is positive and significant (p < 0.01), while the coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE#STANDALONE is insignificant (p = 0.65). This indicates that international 
taxation affects group structures of multinationals irrespective of whether the new affiliate 
belongs to a subgroup in the host country or not. In column 3, we drop regulated industries 
due to the distinct non-tax benefits of organizational forms in these industries (Demirguc-
Kunt et al. 2006, Cerutti et al. 2007). Our results are unchanged. In column 5, we drop 
observations with a tax burden difference equal to zero.39 Although reducing our sample size, 
we still find a positive and significant coefficient on TAXWEDGE (p = 0.06). To address the 
concern that our results are driven by observations from tax havens and do not generalize to 
other settings, we drop organizational form choices if the investing entity is located in a tax 
37 This result is consistent with the argument that the investing entity engages in the host country with a long-term 
perspective (i.e. going concern). 
38 In untabulated tests, we control for the legal origin of the home-country legal system of the ultimate parent. Our 
main inferences are unchanged. 
39 This mainly concerns observations from the European Union where the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive eliminates 
the dividend withholding tax on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions.
- 28 -
haven according to Gravelle (2009).40 In column 7, the coefficient on TAXWEDGE is positive 
and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, observations from tax havens do not affect our results. 
INSERT TABLE 12 HERE
Third, we alter our regression model and re-estimate Equation (1). In untabulated tests, 
we exclude industry and year-fixed effects to address econometric concerns raised by Greene 
(2004). In addition, we replace the logistic regression with a probit regression and a linear 
probability model. We continue to find positive and significant coefficients on TAXWEDGE. 
Taken together, these robustness tests corroborate our main results.
Heterogeneity in Flow-Throughs and Tax-Sensitivity 
Thus far, we have treated flow-throughs as a uniform category of organizational 
forms. The MiDi database enables us to subdivide flow-throughs into partnerships and 
branches, which differ in the degree of liability.41 Some types of partnerships induce limited 
liability for the investing entity while retaining tax and non-tax benefits of a flow-through 
(e.g., lower tax burden, less extensive financial reporting requirements).42 Branches, in 
contrast, necessarily induce unlimited liability. Thus, the benefit of limited liability might be 
less relevant when choosing between a subsidiary and a partnership as an organizational form 
for the new affiliate but gains relevance when choosing between a subsidiary and a branch. 
To test this, we modify Equation (1) and present results in Table 13. We estimate a 
multinomial logistic regression with PARTNERSHIP-BRANCH as a dependent variable. This 
categorical variable has the value of zero if the new affiliate is established as a subsidiary, one 
if established as a partnership, and two if established as a branch.43 The regression includes 
40 From the home countries in Table 3, we drop observations of investing entities located in the British Virgin 
Islands, Cyprus, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mauritius, and Switzerland (see Gravelle 2009). 
41 The sub-category of branches also includes permanent establishments. We do not subdivide subsidiaries into (i) 
public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft) and (ii) private limited company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter 
Haftung) as these sub-categories do not differ in the degree of liability. 
42 Partnerships induce limited liability if established in the legal forms of a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
& Compagnie Kommanditgesellschaft (GmbH&Co KG) or a Aktiengesellschaft & Compagnie 
Kommanditgesellschaft (AG&Co KG). These legal forms are comparable to a U.S. Limited Liability Company
(LLC). Due to missing data, we are unable to identify the precise legal form of the new affiliate and to further 
subdivide partnerships. 
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subsidiaries and partnerships in column 1 and subsidiaries and branches in column 2. In line 
with our expectation, the coefficient on TAXWEDGE is positive and significant in column 1 
(p < 0.01) but insignificant in column 2 (p = 0.84). This asymmetric effect suggests that 
investing entities are tax-sensitive when deciding between a subsidiary and a partnership, 
while the benefit of limited liability dominates the choice between a subsidiary and a branch. 
Treaty Shopping and Tax-Sensitivity 
Our main tests suggest that the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary affects organizational 
form choices of investing entities. One strategy to mitigate the tax disadvantage of a 
subsidiary is treaty shopping, whereby multinationals engage in indirect investment and 
strategically locate an affiliate in a third country to benefit from double tax treaties (Mintz and 
Weichenrieder 2010, Dyreng et al. 2015). Thus, indirect investment driven by treaty shopping 
might reduce the tax-sensitivity of investing entities in organizational form choices.44
To examine whether treaty shopping decreases the tax-sensitivity, we interact 
TAXWEDGE with DIRECTFDI, which is an indicator variable with the value of one if the 
investing entity engages in direct investment. We present results in Table 13. In column 3, we 
find a positive and significant coefficient on TAXWEDGE (p = 0.02), while the coefficient on 
TAXWEDGE#DIRECTFDI is insignificant (p = 0.22).45 These results provide no evidence 
that treaty shopping affects the tax-sensitivity of investing entities. 
INSERT TABLE 13 HERE
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we examine whether, when, and to what extent international taxation 
affects the organizational form multinationals choose for a newly established foreign affiliate. 
43 The 533 flow-throughs in our sample include 469 partnerships and 64 branches. 
44 At the same time, indirect investment might be driven by non-tax aspects, for instance to exploit regulatory 
differences across countries (Cerutti et al. 2007).
45 An F-test suggests that the effect of TAXWEDGE on FLOW-THROUGH for direct investment (β1+β3) is larger 
than zero (p < 0.01). 
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We use micro-level data on the stock of inbound FDI relations in Germany and study the 
choices of investing entities located in 59 home countries. Due to variations in tax rates and 
tax systems across countries and over time, our setting is unique to identify and estimate the 
effect of international taxation on the choice between a subsidiary and a flow-through. We 
find that 24.43 percent of organizational form choices result in a flow-through, which 
suggests that flow-throughs are highly relevant for group structures of multinationals. 
Regression results indicate that investing entities are sensitive to the tax disadvantage of a 
subsidiary in organizational form choices. This effect, which mainly results from differences 
in repatriation taxes between organizational forms, is economically meaningful where a one 
standard deviation increase in the tax disadvantage of a subsidiary is associated with a 3.57 
percentage point higher probability of establishing a flow-through. 
Results from cross-sectional tests suggest that tax and non-tax aspects associated with 
organizational form choices moderate the tax-sensitivity of investing entities. With respect to 
tax aspects, we find that repatriation strategies that do not trigger the effects of international 
taxation (e.g., income shifting) decrease the tax-sensitivity of investing entities. Similarly, the 
non-tax benefit of limited liability mitigates the tax-sensitivity of investing entities in capital-
intensive industries (e.g., manufacturing). Low group structure adjustment costs and host-
country experience, in contrast, increase the tax-sensitivity. 
Taken together, our results provide evidence that international taxation affects group 
structures of multinationals by way of organizational form choices. International taxation has 
far-reaching implications for the strategies multinationals employ for their cross-border 
economic activities as it affects the location of affiliates (Mintz and Weichenrieder 2010, 
Dyreng et al. 2015) and their organizational form. This is relevant as organizational forms 
induce distinct tax and non-tax costs and benefits. Moreover, the drivers of cross-sectional 
variation in the effect of taxation (income-shifting opportunities, group structure adjustment 
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costs, host-country experience) differ from those identified in domestic settings (e.g., Gordon 
and MacKie-Mason 1994, Petroni and Shackelford 1995, Ayers et al. 1996, Goolsbee 2004). 
Our findings also inform current tax-policy initiatives to curb tax avoidance and 
income shifting and suggest that tax-policy actions leading to an asymmetric taxation of 
subsidiaries and flow-throughs increase the likelihood that multinationals select a flow-
through for cross-border economic activities. The relevance of flow-throughs suggests that 
prior studies that examine corporate affiliates have probably overlooked significant parts of 
existing group structures and that multinationals might use organizational forms as part of a 
broader tax-avoidance strategy. We welcome more research on this topic in the future. 
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Appendix
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variables
FLOW-THROUGH Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established in year t as a flow-through, and zero otherwise (i.e. 
as a subsidiary). Source: MiDi-Database, variable re1 = 3 or 4, 
Schild and Walter (2015).
PARTNERSHIP-BRANCH Categorical variable with the value of zero if the new affiliate is 
established in year t as a subsidiary, one if established as a 
partnership, and two if established as a branch. Source: MiDi-
Database, variable re1 = 3 for partnership, re1 = 4 for branch, 
Schild and Walter (2015).
Tax Variables
TAXWEDGE Tax burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through 
on foreign profit earned in the new affiliate in year t. The 
variable is determined by the home country of the investing 
entity. We collect information from Worldwide Corporate Tax 
Guides and domestic tax law. The variable is measured in 
percentage points. Source: Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides 
2005-2013, Ernst & Young (2005-2013); own calculations.
WHT Dividend-withholding tax rate levied on a subsidiary’s dividend 
distributions in year t. The variable is determined by the home 
country of the investing entity. We collect information from 
German tax law and double tax treaties concluded between 
Germany and the home country of the investing entity. The 
variable is measured in percentage points. Source: German 
Double Tax Treaties, German Domestic Tax Law.
CAPWEDGE Tax-burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through 
on capital gains from selling the new affiliate in year t. The 
variable is determined by the home country of the investing 
entity. We collect information from Worldwide Corporate Tax 
Guides and double tax treaties concluded between Germany and 
the home country of the investing entity. The variable is 
measured in percentage points. Source: Worldwide Corporate 
Tax Guide 2005-2013, Ernst & Young (2005-2013); own 
calculations.
Control Variables
LN(EMPLOY) Natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of employees of the new 
affiliate in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, variable ln(1+p05), 
Schild and Walter (2015).
LN(ASSETS) Natural logarithm of 1 plus total assets of the new affiliate in 
year t. Source: MiDi-Database, variable ln(1+p40), Schild and 
Walter (2015).
LOSSYEAR Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate 
reports a loss in year t, and zero otherwise. Source: MiDi-
Database, variable p32 < 0, Schild and Walter (2015).
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LEVERAGE Debt ratio of the new affiliate in year t as total debt divided by 
total assets. Source: MiDi-Database, variables p33/p40, Schild 
and Walter (2015).
ROA Return on assets of the new affiliate in year t as net profit 
divided by total assets. Source: MiDi-Database, variables 
p32/p40, Schild and Walter (2015).
BROWNFIELD Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established in year t through M&A, and zero otherwise (i.e. 
through greenfield investment). Source: MiDi-Database, variable 
em1= 2, Schild and Walter (2015).
DISTRIBUTION Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate 
distributes foreign profit in year t+1, and zero otherwise. We 
determine distributions as the reduction in total equity from year 
t to year t+1 (total equity in year t + profit in year t + retained 
profit in year t – total equity in year t+1 – retained profit in year 
t+1). Source: MiDi-Database, DISTRIBUTION = variables 
p23[t] + p29[t] + p30[t] + p32[t] + p31[t] – p23[t+1] – 
p29[t+1] – p30[t+1] – p31[t+1], Schild and Walter (2015).
INTERNDEBT Internal debt ratio of the new affiliate in year t as related-party 
debt divided by total assets. Source: MiDi-Database, variables
p34/p40 (for years 2005-2008) and (p35+p37)/p40 (for years 
2009-2013), Schild and Walter (2015).
INTANGIBLES Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established in year t in an industry with high intangible-asset 
intensity, and zero otherwise. We classify industries with either 
of the following NACE Rev. 2 codes as having high intangible-
asset intensity: 1900, 2000, 2100, 2600, 2700, 2800, 2900, 5800, 
5900, 6000, 6100, 6200, 6300. Source: MiDi-Database, variable 
br1, Schild and Walter (2015).
NUMINV Number of inbound FDI relations of the investing entity in 
Germany in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, sum of variable nu4, 
Schild and Walter (2015).
HOLDINGS Percentage of shares held by the investing entity in the new 
affiliate in year t. Source: MiDi-Database, variable bgu, Schild 
and Walter (2015).
DIRECTFDI Indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity is 
located in the same country as the ultimate parent of the 
multinational in year t, and zero otherwise. Source: MiDi-
Database, variables lan = la4, Schild and Walter (2015). 
LN(DIST) Natural logarithm of the distance between the capital city of the 
home country of the investing entity and Germany. Distance is 
measured in kilometers. Source: Gleditsch (2013).
Additional Home-Country Controls
LEGOR_GER Indicator variable with the value of one if the home-country 
legal system of the investing entity is of German legal origin, 
and zero otherwise. Source: LaPorta et al. (2008).
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LEGOR_UK Indicator variable with the value of one if the home-country 
legal system of the investing entity is of British legal origin, and 
zero otherwise. Source: LaPorta et al. (2008).
LEGOR_FR Indicator variable with the value of one if the home-country 
legal system of the investing entity is of French legal origin, and 
zero otherwise. Source: LaPorta et al. (2008).
LEGOR_SC Indicator variable with the value of one if the home-country 
legal system of the investing entity is of Scandinavian legal 
origin, and zero otherwise. Source: LaPorta et al. (2008).
Additional Partitioning Variables
HIGH_INTDEBT Indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of related-
party debt provided by foreign affiliates to total assets of the 
new affiliate in year t is above the sample median, and zero 
otherwise. Source: MiDi-Database, variables p37/p40, Schild 
and Walter (2015).
MANU_WHS Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established in year t in the manufacturing or wholesale 
industry, and zero otherwise. Manufacturing denotes industry 
classification C and wholesale industry classification G (one-
digit NACE Rev. 2 codes). Source: MiDi-Database, variable 
br1, Schild and Walter (2015).
MSUBS Indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity 
has at least one additional inbound FDI relation in Germany in 
year t, and zero otherwise. Source: variable NUMINV.
STANDALONE Indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate 
does not hold shares in another German affiliate in year t, and 
zero otherwise. Source: MiDi-Database, sum of variable nu2, 
Schild and Walter (2015)
TAXHAVEN Indicator variable with the value of one if the investing entity 
is located in a tax haven, and zero. Source: MiDi-Database, 
variable lan, Schild and Walter (2015). 
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FIGURES
Figure 1
International Taxation and Tax Effects of Organizational Forms
Note: This figure presents the three layers of international taxation and the tax effects of organizational forms. The 
investing entity is located in a home country and selects an organizational form for a new affiliate in the host 
country (i.e. Germany). The investing entity is part of a multinational and located in the same country as the 
ultimate parent of the multinational (e.g., the United States: direct investment) or in a different country (e.g., 
Luxembourg: indirect investment). The three layers of international taxation determine the tax burden on foreign 
profit earned in a subsidiary or a flow-through. Layer 1 is the host country corporate income tax . The host ℎ
country equally taxes profit earned in a subsidiary or a flow-through. Layer 2 is the dividend-withholding tax  
levied on a subsidiary’s dividend distributions in the host country. This tax does not apply on a flow-through. 
Layer 3 is the home country corporate income tax rate . The home county taxes foreign profit when earned ℎ
in the host country or when repatriated to the investing entity. To mitigate double taxation, the home country either 
exempts foreign profit from  (territorial tax system) or taxes foreign profit at  while granting a tax credit ℎ ℎ
for  and  (worldwide tax system with direct or indirect tax credit). Some home countries do not grant any  ℎ
relief from double taxation.
Ultimate Parent 
Investing Entity
(e.g., U.S.)
Subsidiary
(GER)
Flow-Through
(GER)
Direct Investment
Investing Entity
(e.g., LUX)
Subsidiary
(GER)
Flow-Through
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TABLES
Table 1
Tax Burden Difference between a Subsidiary and a Flow-Through
Tax System Tax Burden Difference (TS – TF)
Territorial tax system (1 – ) * τw
ℎ

Worldwide tax system (direct tax credit)
if  >  > τw
ℎ
 ℎ (1 – ) * τw
ℎ

if  >  ˄ τw > 
ℎ
 ℎ ℎ (1 – ) * τw
ℎ

if   >  ˄   > τw
ℎ
 ℎ ℎ – * τw
ℎ
 ℎ
if τw >  > 
ℎ
 ℎ  + (1 – ) * τw – 
ℎ
 ℎ ℎ
Worldwide tax system (indirect tax credit)
if  > ℎ ℎ (1 – ) * τw
ℎ

if   > + (1 – ) * τw > 
ℎ
 ℎ ℎ ℎ 0
if + (1 – ) * τw >  > 
ℎ
 ℎ ℎ ℎ + (1 – ) * τw – 
ℎ
 ℎ ℎ
No relief from double taxation (1 – ) * τw
ℎ

Note: This table presents the tax burden difference between a subsidiary and a flow-through on foreign 
profit earned in the host country. We derive the tax burden difference for each tax system. TS is the tax 
burden on foreign profit earned in a subsidiary and TF on foreign profit earned in a flow-through, 
respectively.  is the host country corporate income tax, τw the dividend-withholding tax on a 
ℎ

subsidiary’s dividend distributions, and  the home country corporate income tax. To mitigate ℎ
double taxation, the home country either exempts foreign profit from  (territorial tax system) or ℎ
taxes foreign profit at  while granting a tax credit for  and  (worldwide tax system with ℎ  ℎ
direct or indirect tax credit). Some home countries do not grant any relief from double taxation (no relief 
from double taxation). We use these formulas to calculate TAXWEDGE. We define variables in the 
Appendix.
- 41 -
Table 2
Sample Selection 
Data Restrictions Observations
First observation of an inbound FDI relation in Germany (period 1999-2013) 18,265
Less observations prior to the year 2005 -12,206
Less observations where the investing entity holds < 25% in the shares -360
Less observations without reliable tax information -19
Less observations of pre-existing affiliates -3,498
Final Sample (Sample Years 2005-2013) 2,182
Note: This table presents the sample selection for a sample of organizational form choices for new affiliates 
established in Germany (sample years 2005-2013). The new affiliates are either established through greenfield 
investment or M&A. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 3
TAXWEDGE per Home Country of the Investing Entity and Sample Year
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 0.95 0.95 0.95 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
British Virgin Islands 14.67 14.67 14.67 18.51 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11
Canada 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.83 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
China 5.56 5.56 5.56 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02 7.02
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.02 7.02
Czech Republic 14.46 13.35 13.35 14.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Jersey 14.67 14.67 14.67 18.51 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11 11.11
Liechtenstein 14.67 14.67 14.67 18.51 11.11 11.11 -1.39 -1.39 0.00
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 2.78 2.78 2.78 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
Mauritius 2.78 2.78 2.78 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51 3.51
Mexico 2.78 2.78 2.78 3.51 3.51 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
Republic of Korea 15.30 15.30 15.30 19.30 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98 16.98
Russian Federation 11.13 11.13 11.13 14.04 11.23 10.88 10.88 10.88 10.88
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.17
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 2.78 2.78 2.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: This table presents TAXWEDGE per home country of the investing entity and sample year. We present 
home countries with at least three observations per organizational form that result from three distinct investing 
entities. Our sample includes another 32 home countries which do not fulfill this confidentiality requirement. 
We define variables in the Appendix. Source: Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides 2005-2013, Ernst & Young, 
2005-2013; own calculations.
- 43 -
Table 4
WHT per Home Country of the Investing Entity and Sample Year
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
British Virgin Islands 26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 15.83 15.83 15.83 15.83 15.83
Canada 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
China 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
Cyprus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Czech Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jersey 26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 15.83 15.83 15.83 15.83 15.83
Liechtenstein 26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 15.83 15.83 15.83 15.83 0.00
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Mauritius 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Mexico 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Republic of Korea 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Russian Federation 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
United States 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Note: This table presents WHT per home country of the investing entity and sample year. We present home 
countries with at least three observations per organizational form that result from three distinct investing entities. 
Our sample includes another 32 home countries which do not fulfill this confidentiality requirement. We define 
variables in the Appendix. Source: German Double Tax Treaties, German Domestic Tax Law.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Full Sample Subsidiaries (N = 1,649) Flow-Throughs (N = 533)
Variables N Mean StdDev Mean StdDev N StdDev t-statistics
FLOW-THROUGH 2,182 0.244 0.430 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
TAXWEDGE 2,182 1.153 3.501 1.015 3.190 1.580 4.300 -2.793***
LN(EMPLOY) 2,182 1.584 2.165 1.734 2.215 1.119 1.930 6.163***
LN(ASSETS) 2,182 17.280 1.594 17.310 1.608 17.200 1.550 1.429
LOSSYEAR 2,182 0.527 0.499 0.563 0.496 0.413 0.493 6.124***
LEVERAGE 2,182 0.654 0.574 0.652 0.575 0.661 0.572 -0.290
ROA 2,182 -0.032 0.315 -0.019 0.296 -0.073 0.363 3.065***
BROWNFIELD 2,182 0.518 0.500 0.530 0.499 0.482 0.500 1.921*
DISTRIBUTION 2,182 0.227 0.419 0.200 0.400 0.313 0.464 -5.083***
INTERNDEBT 2,182 0.324 0.510 0.350 0.546 0.243 0.364 5.173***
INTANGIBLES 2,182 0.109 0.311 0.127 0.333 0.051 0.220 6.105***
NUMINV 2,182 3.655 7.716 2.796 5.500 6.313 11.880 -6.613***
HOLDINGS 2,182 0.918 0.181 0.928 0.172 0.886 0.202 4.341***
DIRECTFDI 2,182 0.754 0.431 0.777 0.416 0.683 0.466 4.177***
LN(DIST) 2,182 6.241 1.448 6.305 1.480 6.041 1.328 3.873***
WHT 2,182 2.010 5.112 1.855 4.707 2.487 6.180 -2.166**
CAPWEDGE 2,182 -29.510 12.840 -29.440 13.560 -29.740 10.300 0.548
(continued on next page)
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Panel B: Organizational Form Choices per Sample Year
Years Subsidiaries Flow-Throughs Total
2005 136 25 161
2006 274 37 311
2007 240 66 306
2008 187 70 257
2009 141 56 197
2010 126 30 156
2011 192 51 243
2012 174 100 274
2013 179 98 277
Total 1,649 533 2,182
Panel C: Organizational Form Choices per Industry
Industries Subsidiaries Flow-Throughs Total
Manufacturing 287 46 333
Energy Supply 25 58 83
Construction 237 147 384
Wholesale 137 11 148
Transportation 36 11 47
Information and Communication 41 7 48
Financial Services 481 154 635
Professional Services 325 78 403
Other Services 80 21 101
Total 1,649 533 2,182
(continued on next page)
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Panel D: Organizational Form Choices per Home Country
Countries Subsidiaries Flow-Throughs Total
Austria 131 34 165
Belgium 25 8 33
British Virgin Islands 6 0 6
Canada 9 4 13
China 26 3 29
Cyprus 19 4 23
Czech Republic 5 0 5
Denmark 36 18 54
Finland 18 0 18
France 80 17 97
Ireland 18 6 24
Italy 35 9 44
Jersey 12 24 36
Liechtenstein 4 8 12
Luxembourg 367 132 499
Malaysia 3 0 3
Mauritius 3 0 3
Mexico 3 0 3
Netherlands 237 85 322
Norway 10 3 13
Republic of Korea 8 0 8
Russian Federation 3 0 3
Spain 31 5 36
Sweden 38 4 42
Switzerland 135 55 190
United Kingdom 130 45 175
United States 127 23 150
Additional Observations 130 46 176
Total 1,649 533 2,182
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics. Panel A presents means and standard deviations for 
dependent and independent variables. We present values for the full sample and subsamples of subsidiaries 
and flow-throughs. We conduct two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variances to compare means between 
subsamples. Panel B presents organizational form choices per sample year. Panel C presents organizational 
form choices per industry. Industry classification is based on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes. Panel D presents 
organizational form choices per home country of the investing entity. We present home countries with at 
least three observations per organizational form that result from three distinct investing entities. Our sample 
includes another 32 home countries which do not fulfill this confidentiality requirement. We summarize 
these observations under Additional Observations. We define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. Source: Research Data and 
Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 
2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 6
Correlation Table
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) FLOW-THROUGH 1.000
(2) TAXWEDGE 0.069* 1.000
(3) LN(EMPLOY) -0.122* -0.006 1.000
(4) LN(ASSETS) -0.030 -0.066* 0.084* 1.000
(5) LOSSYEAR -0.130* -0.027 -0.158* -0.027 1.000
(6) LEVERAGE 0.006 -0.002 -0.070* -0.218* 0.200* 1.000
(7) ROA -0.073* 0.029 0.029 0.138* -0.301* -0.377* 1.000
(8) BROWNFIELD -0.041 0.019 0.254* -0.020 -0.106* 0.042 -0.012 1.000
(9) DISTRIBUTION 0.117* 0.038 0.045 0.041 -0.241* -0.103* 0.101* 0.092* 1.000
(10) INTERNDEBT -0.090* -0.020 -0.069* -0.067* 0.165* 0.706* -0.191* 0.027 -0.108* 1.000
(11) INTANGIBLES -0.106* 0.023 0.445* -0.065* -0.115* -0.057* 0.029 0.160* -0.003 -0.062* 1.000
(12) NUMINV 0.196* -0.084* -0.220* -0.186* 0.032 0.245* -0.131* -0.083* 0.020 -0.090* -0.111* 1.000
(13) HOLDINGS -0.100* -0.125* -0.047 -0.015 0.102* 0.056* -0.022 -0.064* -0.054 0.114* -0.066* 0.018 1.000
(14) DIRECTFDI -0.094* 0.040 -0.010 -0.127* -0.012 -0.015 0.040 -0.039 -0.036 -0.074* 0.001 -0.002 -0.112* 1.000
(15) LN(DIST) -0.078* 0.428* 0.188* -0.054 -0.064* -0.091* 0.035 0.065* -0.034 0.025 0.148* -0.252* -0.065* 0.179* 1.000
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients. We define variables in the Appendix. * denotes significance at the 1% level. Source: Research Data and Service Centre 
(RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 7
Baseline Tests: Tax-Sensitivity in Organizational Form Choices
FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pred. Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx
TAXWEDGE + 0.192*** 0.032 0.226*** 0.036
(0.063) (0.071)  
LN(EMPLOY) - 0.012 0.002 -0.006 -0.001
(0.098) (0.097)  
LN(ASSETS) - 0.034 0.005 0.022 0.003
(0.070) (0.070)
LOSSYEAR - -0.397*** -0.063 -0.395*** -0.063
(0.080) (0.080)  
LEVERAGE - -0.228 -0.036 -0.190 -0.030
(0.141)  (0.140)  
ROA +/- -0.317** -0.050 -0.304* -0.048
(0.162)  (0.168)  
BROWNFIELD - -0.206*** -0.033 -0.203*** -0.032
(0.076)  (0.076)  
DISTRIBUTION + 0.146** 0.023 0.157** 0.025
(0.062)  (0.063)  
INTERNDEBT - -0.155 -0.024 -0.179 -0.028
(0.134)  (0.134)  
INTANGIBLES - -0.244** -0.039 -0.247** -0.039
(0.112)  (0.112)  
NUMINV + 0.257* 0.041 0.241* 0.038
(0.146)  (0.145)  
HOLDINGS - -0.220*** -0.035 -0.244*** -0.039
(0.060)  (0.058)  
DIRECTFDI +/- -0.243*** -0.038 -0.264*** -0.042
(0.074) (0.076)  
LN(DIST) + -0.070 -0.011 0.056 0.009
(0.084)  (0.077)  
Intercept -0.097 -0.661 -0.682
(0.368)  (0.297)  (0.296)
Industry-FE Y Y Y
Year-FE Y Y Y
N 2,182 2,182 2,182
Log-Likelihood -1067.000 -983.400 -990.700
Pseudo R-squared 0.120 0.189 0.183
Area under ROC curve 0.724 0.780 0.775
Note: This table presents regression results for baseline tests of the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices. 
The dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6) report coefficients (marginal 
effects) for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while holding continuous 
variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We calculate 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data 
and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 
2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 8
Cross-Sectional Tests: Income-Shifting Opportunities and Tax-Sensitivity
FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pred. Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx
TAXWEDGE β1 + 0.332*** 0.052 0.248*** 0.039 0.177** 0.028
(0.078)  (0.073)  (0.077)  
HIGH_INTDEBT - -0.127 -0.020
(0.085)  
TAXWEDGE#HIGH_INTDEBT β3 - -0.305*** -0.048
(0.100)  
INTANGIBLES - -0.232*** -0.036 -0.195* -0.031 -0.244** -0.038
(0.112)  (0.114)  (0.112)  
TAXWEDGE#INTANGIBLES β5 - -0.156* -0.025
(0.093)  
DISTRIBUTION + 0.128** 0.142** 0.022 0.114* 0.018
(0.063) (0.063)  (0.067)  
TAXWEDGE#DISTRIBUTION β7 +/- 0.094 0.015
(0.070)  
LN(EMPLOY) - 0.028 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.015 0.002
(0.097)  (0.098)  (0.098)  
LN(ASSETS) - 0.035 0.005 0.040 0.006 0.033 0.005
(0.071)  (0.070)  (0.070)  
LOSSYEAR - -0.409*** -0.064 -0.398*** -0.063 -0.404*** -0.064
(0.080)  (0.080)  (0.080)  
LEVERAGE - -0.220* -0.034 -0.232* -0.037 -0.231 -0.036
(0.116)  (0.141)  (0.141)  
ROA +/- -0.312** -0.049 -0.319** -0.050 -0.323** -0.051
(0.155)  (0.160)  (0.160)  
BROWNFIELD - -0.215*** -0.034 -0.208*** -0.033 -0.207*** -0.033
(0.077)  (0.076)  (0.076)  
INTERNDEBT - -0.152 -0.024 0.151 -0.024
(0.134)  (0.134)  
NUMINV + 0.257*   0.040 0.261* 0.041 0.257* 0.041
(0.148)  (0.147)  (0.146)  
HOLDINGS - -0.219*** -0.034 -0.222*** -0.035 -0.220*** -0.035
(0.061)  (0.060)  (0.060)  
DIRECTFDI +/- -0.243*** -0.038 -0.239*** -0.038 -0.239*** -0.038
(0.074)  (0.074)  (0.074)  
LN(DIST) + -0.054 -0.008 -0.068 -0.011 -0.069 -0.011
(0.085)  (0.084)  (0.085)  
Intercept -0.607** -0.669** -0.651** 0.000
(0.299)  (0.297)  (0.297)  
Industry-FE Y Y Y
Year-FE Y Y Y
N 2,182 2,182 2,182
Log-Likelihood -971.400 -981.800 -982.200
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.191 0.190
Area under ROC curve 0.792 0.781 0.780
F-Test: β1+β3=0 0.070 - -
F-Test: β1+β5=0 - 0.760 -
F-Test: β1+β7=0 - - 11.190
p-Value 0.792 0.385 < 0.001***
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Note: This table presents regression results for cross-sectional tests of the effect of income-shifting opportunities 
on the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices. We partition the sample based on income-shifting opportunities 
in columns 1-4 and the repatriation of foreign profit in columns 5-6. The dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is 
an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. 
HIGH_INTDEBT is an indicator variable with the value of one if the ratio of related-party debt provided by foreign 
affiliates to total assets of the new affiliate is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. INTANGIBLES is an 
indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established in an industry with high intangible-asset 
intensity, and zero otherwise. DISTRIBUTION is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate 
distributes foreign profit, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 6) report coefficients (marginal effects) 
for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at 
their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to 
estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We calculate 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data 
and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 
2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 9
Cross-Sectional Tests: Non-Tax Aspects and Tax-Sensitivity
FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pred. Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx
TAXWEDGE β1 + 0.400***  0.055 0.122 0.019 0.123 0.019
(0.105)  (0.089)  (0.075)  
MANU_WHS - -0.472**   -0.065
(0.232)  
TAXWEDGE#MANU_WHS β3 - -0.234* -0.032
(0.136)  
BROWNFIELD - -0.090 -0.012 -0.249*** -0.039 -0.224*** -0.035
(0.090)  (0.083)  (0.079)  
TAXWEDGE#BROWNFIELD β5 + 0.155* 0.024
(0.082)  
MSUBS + 0.050 0.008
(0.109)  
TAXWEDGE#MSUBS β7 + 0.192** 0.030
(0.089)  
LN(EMPLOY) - -0.289** -0.040 0.013 0.002 -0.003 0.000
(0.133)  (0.098)  (0.099)  
LN(ASSETS) - 0.200** 0.028 0.028 0.004 0.012 0.002
(0.087)  (0.070)  (0.069)  
LOSSYEAR - -0.407*** -0.056 -0.393*** -0.062 -0.401*** -0.063
(0.101)  (0.079)  (0.085)  
LEVERAGE - -0.395* -0.055 -0.223 -0.035 -0.116 -0.018
(0.222)  (0.142)  (0.174)  
ROA +/- -0.532* -0.074 -0.312* -0.049 -0.323* -0.051
(0.307)  (0.163)  (0.168)  
DISTRIBUTION + 0.181** 0.025 0.149** 0.024 0.147** 0.023
(0.077)  (0.062)  (0.062)  
INTERNDEBT - -0.081 -0.011 -0.162 -0.026 -0.270* -0.043
(0.170)  (0.133)  (0.159)  
INTANGIBLES - -0.280** -0.039 -0.237** -0.037 -0.246** -0.039
(0.126)  (0.113)  (0.113)  
NUMINV + -0.008 -0.001 0.255 0.040
(0.173)  (0.147)  
HOLDINGS - -0.199*** -0.028 -0.222*** -0.035 -0.217*** -0.034
(0.075)  (0.060)  (0.060)  
DIRECTFDI +/- -0.400*** -0.055 -0.247*** -0.039 -0.250*** -0.039
(0.089)  (0.074)  (0.077)  
LN(DIST) + -0.160 -0.022 -0.072 -0.011 -0.082 -0.013
(0.115)  (0.085)  (0.084)  
Intercept -1.590*** -0.632** -0.531
(0.344)  (0.299)  (0.341)  
Industry-FE Y Y Y
Year-FE Y Y Y
N 1,416 2,182 2,182
Log-Likelihood -590.600 -981.300 -985.100
Pseudo R-squared 0.212 0.191 0.188
Area under ROC curve 0.802 0.781 0.783
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F-Test: β1+β3=0 1.379 - -
F-Test: β1+β5=0 - 13.830   -
F-Test: β1+β7=0 - - 9.920
p-Value 0.242 < 0.001*** 0.002***
Note: This table presents regression results for cross-sectional tests of the effect of non-tax aspects on the tax-
sensitivity in organizational form choices. We drop regulated industries (industry classification D, J, and K based 
on one-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes) in columns 1-2. We partition the sample based on non-tax aspects associated with 
organizational form choices in columns 1-6. The dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable 
with the value of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. MANU_WHS is an 
indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established in the manufacturing or the wholesale 
industry, and zero otherwise. BROWNFIELD is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established through M&A, and zero otherwise. MSUBS is an indicator variable with the value of one if the investing 
entity has at least one additional inbound FDI relation in Germany, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, 
and 6) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal 
effects while holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and 
industry-fixed effects. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. 
We define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 
(two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct 
Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 10
Cross-Sectional Tests: Host-Country Experience and Tax-Sensitivity
FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH
BROWNFIELD = 0 BROWNFIELD = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pred. Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx
TAXWEDGE β1  + -0.053 -0.009 0.295*** 0.041
(0.103) (0.105)
MSUBS  + -0.169 -0.028 -0.019 -0.003
(0.124) (0.145)  
TAXWEDGE#MSUBS β3  +/- 0.236** 0.039 0.134 0.019
(0.093) (0.103)  
Additional Controls Y Y
Industry-FE Y Y
Year-FE Y Y
N 1,051 1,131
Log-Likelihood -486.100 -448.100
Pseudo R-squared 0.197 0.261
Area under ROC curve 0.798 0.807
F-Test: β1+β3=0 2.630 13.400
p-Value 0.105 < 0.001***
Note: This table presents regression results for cross-sectional tests of the effect of host-country experience 
on the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices. We limit the analysis to organizational form choices for 
greenfield investment in columns 1-2 (BROWNFIELD = 0) and to organizational form choices for M&A in 
columns 3-4 (BROWNFIELD = 1). We partition the sample based on host-country experience. The dependent 
variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is established as 
a flow-through, and zero otherwise. MSUBS is an indicator variable with the value of one if the investing 
entity has at least one additional inbound FDI relation in Germany, and zero otherwise. Columns 1 and 3 (2 
and 4) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate 
marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are 
estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own 
calculations.
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Table 11
Robustness Tests: Additional Tax Variables and Home-Country Controls
FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pred. Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx
WHT + 0.235*** 0.037
(0.077)
TAXWEDGE + 0.216*** 0.034 0.202*** 0.032
(0.072) (0.070)
CAPWEDGE +/- -0.092 -0.014
(0.104)
LEGOR_UK +/- 0.148   0.023
(0.099)  
LEGOR_FR +/- -0.004   -0.001
(0.128)  
LEGOR_SC +/- -0.046 -0.007
(0.086)  
Additional Controls Y Y Y
Industry-FE Y Y Y
Year-FE Y Y Y
N 2,182 2,182 2,182
Log-Likelihood -983.700 -982.800 -980.600
Pseudo R-squared 0.189 0.190 0.192
Area under ROC curve 0.779 0.781 0.780
Note: This table presents regression results for robustness tests of the tax-sensitivity in organizational form 
choices. We replace TAXWEDGE with WHT in columns 1-2. We include CAPWEDGE in columns 3-4 and 
LEGOR_UK, LEGOR_FR, and LEGOR_SC in columns 5-6. German legal origin (LEGOR_GER) serves as a 
control group in columns 5-6. The dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable with the value 
of one if the new affiliate is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (2, 4, and 
6) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic regression based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal 
effects while holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year 
and industry-fixed effects. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-
entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.
- 55 -
Table 12
Robustness Tests: Modified Samples of Organizational Form Choices
FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH FLOW-THROUGH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pred. Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx Coef./(SE) dy/dx
TAXWEDGE + 0.278*** 0.043 0.313*** 0.043 0.331* 0.044 0.252*** 0.036
(0.106) (0.091) (0.179) (0.087)
STANDALONE +/- 0.327*** 0.051
(0.094)
TAXWEDGE#STANDALONE +/- -0.048 -0.007
(0.106)
Additional Controls Y Y Y Y
Industry-FE Y Y Y Y
Year-FE Y Y Y Y
N 2,182 1,416 419 1,332
Log-Likelihood -975.200 -592.900 -160.400 -580.700
Pseudo R-squared 0.196 0.209 0.317 0.151
Area under ROC curve 0.785 0.800 0.845 0.760
Note: This table presents regression results for robustness tests of the tax-sensitivity in organizational form choices. We partition the sample based on 
whether the new affiliate belongs to a subgroup in Germany in columns 1-2. We drop regulated industries (industry classification D, J, and K based on 
one-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes) in columns 3-4, observations with TAXWEDGE equal to zero in columns 5-6, and observations if the investing entity is 
located in a tax haven in columns 7-8. The dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate is 
established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. STANDALONE is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate does not hold shares 
in another German affiliate, and zero otherwise. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 (2, 4, 6, and 8) report coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic regression 
based on Equation (1). We calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent variables to have 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We 
calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.
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Table 13
Supplementary Analysis: Heterogeneity in Flow-Throughs, Treaty Shopping and Tax-Sensitivity
PARTNERSHIP-BRANCH FLOW-THROUGH
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pred. Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) Coef./(SE) dy/dx
TAXWEDGE β1 + 0.269*** -0.033 0.399** 0.063
(0.074) (0.166)  (0.170)  
DIRECTFDI +/- -0.233*** -0.290** -0.208*** -0.033
(0.081) (0.131)  (0.078)
TAXWEDGE#DIRECTFDI β3 +/- -0.196 -0.031
(0.160)  
Additional Controls Y Y
Industry-FE Y Y
Year-FE Y Y
N 2,182 2,182
Log-Likelihood -1075.000 -981.900
Pseudo R-squared 0.237 0.191
Area under ROC curve - 0.780
F-Test: β1+β3=0 - 8.270
p-Value - 0.004***
Note: This table presents regression results for supplementary analysis of the tax-sensitivity in organizational form 
choices. The dependent variable PARTNERSHIP-BRANCH is a categorical variable with the value of zero if the 
new affiliate is established in year t as a subsidiary, one if established as a partnership, and two if established as a 
branch. The dependent variable FLOW-THROUGH is an indicator variable with the value of one if the new affiliate 
is established as a flow-through, and zero otherwise. DIRECTFDI is an indicator variable with the value of one if 
the investing entity is located in the same country as the ultimate parent. Columns 1 and 2 report coefficients for a 
multinomial logistic regression based on Equation (1) and column 3 (4) coefficients (marginal effects) for a logistic 
regression based on Equation (1). We partition the sample based on direct and indirect investment in columns 3-4. 
We calculate marginal effects while holding continuous variables at their means. We standardize independent 
variables to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimating regressions. All regressions 
are estimated with year and industry-fixed effects. We calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered 
at the investing-entity level. We define variables in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) for the years 2005 to 2013, own calculations.
